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The Court reaffirmed Flanagan v State,
2
 holding that the district court has 
discretion to admit evidence of a codefendant’s sentence in penalty hearings and 




Appellant Shawn Russell Harte and two codefendants were charged and convicted 
of first-degree murder and robbery. Harte was subsequently convicted of felony murder 
and sentenced to death.  The only aggravating factor to support a death sentence was the 
fact the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. Harte’s codefendants were 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Harte previously appealed, but the 
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence.  
Subsequently, the Court decided McConnell v. State,
3
 holding that the same 
felony may not be used both to establish felony murder and as a capital aggravator, and 
Bejarano v. State,
4
 which applied McConnell retroactively.  Harte challenged his 
conviction under McConnell in a post conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; the 
district court granted Harte’s petition and vacated the death sentence.  The Nevada 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, and after a second penalty hearing, 




The district court was within its discretion when it admitted evidence of the codefendants’ 
sentences. 
 
Harte argued the district court erred by admitting evidence of his codefendants’ 
sentences, because it deprived him of his right to be sentenced individually. Harte asked 
the Nevada Supreme Court to overrule Flanagan v. State 
5
 which gave district courts 
discretion to admit or deny evidence of codefendants’ sentences; and instead issue an 
overarching rule that evidence of codefendants’ sentences never be admissible in a 
penalty hearing.  The State argued that the decision to admit or deny such evidence be 
left to the discretion of the district court on a case by case basis.  The Court agreed with 
the State because the trial judge’s discretion in a first-degree murder penalty hearing is 
broad and every case has unique facts and circumstances.
6
   The Court reaffirmed its 
                                                     
1
  By Brandonn Grossman. 
2
  Flanagan v. State, 107 Nev. 243, 247-48. 810P.2d 759, 762 (1991). 
3
  McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004). 
4
  Bejarano v. State, 122 Nev. 1066, 146 P.3d 265 (2006). 
5
  Flanagan, 107 Nev. at  247-48. 810 P.2d at 762. 
6
  Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 769, 263 P.3d 235, 249 (2011); Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 540, 557, 937 
P.2d 473, 484 (1997). 
 2 
holding in Flanagan and held that NRS 175.552 allows the district court to admit this 





The district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to open and 
conclude the closing arguments  
 
Harte claimed the district court erred, arguing NRS 175.141(5) does not apply in a 
penalty hearing.
8
  Additionally, Harte argued the mandate in Schoels v. State
9
 does not 
apply here in a non death penalty case. The Court held it is within the district courts’ 
discretion to let the State argue twice, because district courts have wide discretion in 
many facets of trial procedure.
10
  Since NRS  175.141(5)
11
 already extends to the penalty 
phase of a capital trial,
12
 “the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed 
the State to start and conclude during closing arguments.”  
 
Harte’s sentence was not cruel and unusual 
 
 Harte argued life without parole is an excessive sentence and cited Naovarath v. 
State.
13
 Interpreting Harte’s argument as a cruel and unusual challenge, the Court 
explained a sentence within statutory limits—like here14—is not cruel and unusual unless 
the law setting punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is “so unreasonably 
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.” 15  Here, Harte does not 
allege NRS 200.030(4) is unconstitutional; and the Court easily distinguished Naovarath 
from this case and holding that Harte’s sentence was valid, because it is not grossly 
disproportionate to the crime. 
 
Justice Gibbons’s concurrence in part and dissent in part 
  
Justice Gibbons calls for the Court to revisit the holding in Flanagan, noting he agrees 
with the appellant that there should be a uniform rule for the district courts regarding the 
admission of sentences for codefendants for all penalty hearings:  he would preclude 
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The Court reaffirmed Flanagan v State, holding that the district court has discretion to 
admit evidence of a codefendant’s sentence in penalty hearings and affirming the district 
court’s sentence in the matter. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
